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BOOK REVIEW
SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN THE STATES:
A Survey of State Segregation Laws 1865-1953; Prepared for United
States Supreme Court in re: Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka.'
Edited by Bernard D. Reams, Jr.,2 and Paul E. Wilson.' Buffalo, N.Y.:
William S. Hein & Co. 1975. Pp. xiv, 761. $27.50.
Philip B. Kurland described Brown v. Board of Education as a
symbol of change for the entire country in the resolution of the deepest
and most provocative problem that the country has ever faced."'4 Ber-
nard Schwartz compared Brown's impact on American society to "that
caused by political revolution or military conflict." "Brown," wrote
Yale Kamisar, "is a momentous decision" with consequences that "can-
not begin to be measured by cold statistics .... White America was
never to be the same after Brown."'6
Other commentators have been more disparaging in characterizing
what are now known as the School Desegregation Cases.7  Polemics
against the Warren Court often begin with severe criticism of the
Brown decision.8 (In fact, however, eight members of tho Vinson
Court, joined and assuredly led by new Chief Justice Warren, decided
Brown; furthermore, the Vinson Court's ruling in Sweatt v. Painter0 had
had clearly paved the way for Brown.)10
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Professor of Law and Law Librarian, Washington University.
3. Kane Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
4. P. KURLAND, PoLrrcs, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 79 (1970).
5. B. SCHWARTZ THE LAW IN AMERICA 241 (1974).
6. KAMISAR, The School Desegregation Cases in Retrospect, in ARGUMENT XXIii-
xxv (L. Friedman ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as ARGUMENT]. The order of the quoted
sentences has been rearranged from the original.
7. Perhaps the most notable scholarly critic was Alexander Bickel. See A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), and A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PRoGREss (1970), both passim.
8. Typical of this literature is J. CARTER, THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITU-
TUTION: A CRITICAL VIEV OF JUDICIAL ACTISM (1973).
9. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
10. L. PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SU-
PREME COURT 409-10 (1965); Mendelson, The Politics of ludicial Activism, 24 EMORY
L.J. 43, 57 n.63 (1975).
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Unquestionably, Brown v. Board of Education is destined to rank
among the most important decisions in the Supreme Court's history, and
to be discussed and criticized repeatedly." The oral arguments before
the Supreme Court were published seven years ago,"2 prefaced by an
excellent essay by Yale Kamisar and a useful comment by Dr. Kenneth
B. Clark on the sociological aspects of the case. Professors Reams and
Wilson' 3 have now provided another important ingredient of the School
Desegregation Cases-a compilation of the states' responses to one of
the questions the Supreme Court propounded when it set the cases' 4
for reargument.1
The Court sought counsel's assistance in answering a number of
questions regarding the fourteenth amendment's impact on segregated
public schools. Two of the Court's inquiries concerned the intent of
the Congress that submitted and the states that ratified the fourteenth
amendment in 1868. Counsel were asked to gather any historical evi-
dence indicating that in 1868, Congress and the states contemplated
either that the fourteenth amendment required an immediate end to
segregated public schools, or that it might be so construed by future
Congresses or courts.'"
11. See, e.g., D. BERMAN, IT IS SO ORDERED: THE SUPREME COURT RULES ON
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1966); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); KELLY, The
School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTUTION (J.
Garraty ed. 1966).
12. ARGUMENT, supra note 6.
13. Paul E. Wilson was Assistant Attorney General of Kansas from 1952 to 1957
and argued the Brown case for the State of Kansas. ARGUMENT 26-33, 263-72; Wilson,
Brown v. Board of Education Revisited, 12 Km. L. REv. 507 (1964).
14. Briggs v. Elliott (South Carolina), Davis v. County School Bd. of Prince Ed-
ward County (Virginia), and Gebhart v. Belton (Delaware) were heard and decided by
the Supreme Court in conjunction with Brown. A District of Columbia case, Boiling
v. Sharpe, was argued with these four cases but was the subject of a separate opinion,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), because the fourteenth amendment is not applicable to the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
15. 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
16. The Supreme Court's intermediate order of June 8, 1953, asked that
[ln their briefs and on oral argument counsel ... discuss particularly ...
the following questions...
I. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State leg-
islatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contem-
plated or did not contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would
require the immediate abolition of segregation in public schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the Four-
teenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the imme-
diate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the under-
standing of the framers of the Amendment
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Amassing evidence of this type was a challenging task, because of
the often fragmentary condition of state legislative records and because
the states retained the records in their respective capitals. Further-
more, counsel had little time to do the necessary research, since the
Court handed down its order posing the questions only four months
before the scheduled reargument.17  Participating counsel therefore
coordinated their efforts. The Virginia Attorney General's staff
assumed responsibility for assembling evidence of the intent of the state
legislatures that ratified the fourteenth amendment."' Counsel sent
inquiries to (and received responses from) all thirty six states that were
members of the Union when the amendment was proposed and rati-
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power under sec-
tion 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power in light of future conditions,
to construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force?
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a) and (b) do not dis-
pose of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the Amendment,
to abolish segregation in public schools?
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Four-
teenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set
by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be
admitted to schools of their choice, or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective
gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to
a system not based on color distinctions?
5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assum-
ing further than this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described
in question 4(b)
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view
to recommending specific terms for such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions
to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the
decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first
instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?
345 U.S. at 972-73 (1953).
17. The order posing the questions was handed down on June 8, 1953, and the cases
were set for reargument on October 12, 1953. The October 12 reargument was post-
poned, however, and finally began on December 10, 1953. Wilson, supra note 13, at
523.
15. Brief for Appellees on Reargument, App. B, at 1, Briggs v. Elliott, 347 U.S.
483 (1954); SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN THE STATES vii (B.
Reams & P. Wilson eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Reams & Wilson].
Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond, Jr. later served as Governor of Virginia (1958-
62) and Judge of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (1962-73).
WHO'S WHO IN AM'mucA 54 (30th ed. 1976); Wilson, supra note 13, at 521.
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filed, 19 asking each state to provide a narrative statement and to answer
the following eleven questions:
1. Did your state have a system of free public education at the time
of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868)?
2. When was the free public school system established in your state?
Give constitution or statute reference to school establishment.
3. Has there been segregation by race in the public schools of your
state at any time since their establishment? Give constitution or statute
reference to establishment of such segregation by race and its abolition,
if subsequently abolished.
4. Has segregation by race ever been established in your state for any
other purpose, such as transportation, miscegenation, lodging, public
institutions, public halls and restaurants? If so, specify date of institu-
tion and abolition, if any, and constitution or statute reference.
5. Are there any records of any kind-public or private-as to (a)
the action taken by the legislature or convention in your state in the
consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (b) action taken by
the legislature or constitutional convention in the establishment after
1868 of segregated public schools in your state? Are reports of debates
available? If so, please identify and state where such reports may be
found. Are Committee reports available? If so, please identify and
state where such reports may be found. If there are records of other
kinds, please identify such records and state where such records may
be found.
6. Do these records indicate that the question of segregation by race
in public schools or otherwise was considered by the legislature or con-
vention of your state as it related to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment? If so, identify where the report of such consideration may
be found and specify the consideration given.
7. Is there evidence of any character that the legislature or convention
of your state that considered the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not under-
stand that (ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment) would abolish
segregation in public schools? If so, state where such evidence may be
found and specify what evidence shows.
8. Do the records in your state relating to the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment in any way indicate an understanding (either affir-
mative or negative) (a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise
of their power under Sec. 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation
or (b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future condi-
19. Reams & Wilson vii.
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tions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its
own force?
9. Is there any general reference book as to the establishment and his-
tory of the public school system in your state? If so, please name the
book and state where it may be found.
10. Has there ever been segregation of Indians in the public schools of
your state? If so, give constitution or statute reference to establishment
of such segregation and its abolition, if subsequently abolished. If
Indians have not been segregated, how have they been classified?
11. Has there ever been segregation by sex in your state? If so, give
constitution or statute reference to establishment of such segregation and
its abolition, if subsequently abolished. 20
The Brown opinion suggests that the Supreme Court was unim-
pressed by counsel's response to these questions. The Court acknowl-
edged that reargument had "covered exhaustively consideration of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then
existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of of proponents
and opponents of the Amendment."' 21 The Court concluded, however,
that "[t]his discussion and our own investigation convince us that,
although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the
problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. '22
Professor Alfred H. Kelly, a constitutional historian who assisted the
NAACP in preparing its response to the Court's questions, speculated
that "advocate's overkill" provoked the Court's rather cavalier dismissal
of the effort to furnish historical support for the decision. What coun-
sel finally presented to the Court was, in Kelly's phrase, "law-office
history. . . doctored, distorted, twisted, and suppressed ....
The specific responses compiled by Professors Reams and Wilson,
of course, are largely factual. A statutory reference is not easily
twisted or distorted, though one might wish to suppress it. Consider-
ing the eleven inquiries sent to the states, however, one may legiti-
mately wonder why the last two questions were included. The issue
before the Court was limited to discrimination against blacks. Why,
then, the questions about women and Indians?24  Perhaps an imagina-
tive lawyer saw the possibility of a diversionary argument?
20. The questions appear in this form in each of the thirty-six responses.
21. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
22. Id.
23. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119, 144.
24. Interestingly, none of the briefs for appellees (appellant in the Delaware case)
referred to the replies to these two questions.
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The editors suggest that their compilation "may be useful to both the
historian of the law and the practicing lawyer."25  To be sure, this
volume is a significant supplement to the story of the School Desegrega-
tion Cases. I am more dubious about the book's usefulness to the prac-
titioner. Significant advancements in school desegregation litigation
since Brown'' have rendered the intent of legislatures a century ago
largely irrelevant. Thus, the prime importance of the volume is its
value as an historical record. For example, this book will permit a
scholar to assess the extent to which participating counsel actually relied
on the assembled data, and to what end. This assessment, in turn, will
permit some observations on how lawyers use history-a topic that
deserves illumination in light of the limited but suggestive examinations
by Charles Miller 7 and Alfred Kelly.28  Finally, and most importantly,
this book presents another part of the story of a landmark decision.
The editors deserve our thanks and plaudits for their efforts.
FRANCIS H. HELLER*
25. Reams & Wilson vii-viii.
26. For recent examples, see Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 44 U.S.L.W.
5114 (U.S. June 28, 1976) and Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
27. C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND Tm UsEs OF HIsToRY (1969).
28. Kelly, supra notes 11 & 23.
- Roy A. Roberts Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Kansas.
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